Introduction
Ohio was a pioneer in zoning and land-use regulation, 1 but the consensus view among scholars is that the state has lagged behind in recent decades. 2 Since the 1950's, many states have comprehensively updated their zoning enabling legislation, 3 enacted environmental impact assessment legislation, 4 or recognized the need to create effective mechanisms for land-use regulation beyond the boundaries of a single jurisdiction. 5 Ohio, in contrast, has rejected such efforts 6 
This article faults the Court's opinion invalidating the impact fees in
Hamilton Township, arguing that the Court, rather than engaging in a fair-handed analysis, chose instead to rely on very limited authority to support a conclusion that appears to have been pre-determined. In particular, the article demonstrates that the Court failed even to acknowledge, let alone distinguish: (1) its earlier ruling upholding impact fees in Beavercreek and (2) the state supreme court decisions that had rejected the reasoning of the Iowa and Mississippi courts upon which the Court relied in part. The article notes that the Court's ruling leaves Ohio with a bifurcated approach to impact fees that is perverse because it makes impact fees most defensible in municipalities, in many of which there is little new development, and thus the need for impact fees is less, and effectively prohibits their use in rapidlydeveloping townships where they are needed most. The article concludes that the time is long-past for the legislature to examine the policy debate on impact fees and make a decision about adopting enabling legislation for impact fees, and that the decision should be to join the majority of states that have enacted such legislation.
Background: Origin and Expansion of Development Impact Fees
Local governments have long imposed so-called "dedication" requirements as a condition for subdivision approvals; requiring that developers dedicate land within the subdivision for roads, school and parks. 17 In the case of smaller subdivisions, however, land dedication was often problematic because the dedication required in a small subdivision was too fragmentary to host a functional school or park and/or was not in a suitable location. 18 To address this problem, local governments began to require that the developer pay a fee in-lieu of dedication as a condition for subdivision approval of his project, then used those funds to finance schools, parks and other off-site improvements. 19 Development impact fees [hereafter "impact fees"] were a natural outgrowth of these fee-in-lieu of dedication requirements. In the 1970's, local governments began to levy impact fees on new development to generate revenue for capital facilities, the need for which was created by the new development. The rationale employed when actual dedication or provision of land or improvements is not practical or feasible. For example, under a requirement to set aside 5 per cent of a development's land area as open space, a five-acre subdivision would reserve one-quarter of an acre. Such a site might prove to be totally impractical for both the subdivision and the community. The alternatives were either to exempt smaller subdivisions from such requirements or to allow a payment to be made in lieu of dedication. This resulted in local governments requiring money in lieu of land dedication. The money exacted was to equal the value of the land that would have been dedicated." See also, Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Robert Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Local Government's Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 415, 418 (1981) .
behind impact fees is straight-forward: new development should be required to pay its fair-share of the costs of providing public services and facilities to meet the demand for those services and facilities created by those who would be living in the new development. 20 With the decline of federal and state grants to local governments 21 and the anti-tax revolution in the late 1970s, 22 the use of impact fees expanded in the 1980's to include an array of municipal facilities/services, such as fire, police and libraries. 23 The legal status of impact fees was initially at issue, but a series of court cases from California, 24 Florida, 25 80s and, by 1986, three states had enacted impact fee enabling legislation. 27 Over the next 25 years, more than half the states adopted such acts 28 and, even in states without enabling legislation, impact fees frequently exist in one form or another, having been enacted on the basis of local home rule powers or jurisdiction-specific enabling legislation. 29 The Current Status of Impact Fees in Ohio
The Road to Beavercreek
As noted in the Introduction, while Ohio is among the minority of states that has not enacted enabling legislation for impact fees, in Beavercreek, 30 the Ohio Supreme Court approved the use of impact fees by municipalities, provided certain conditions were met. 31 Prior to Beavercreek, which approved an impact fee for road improvements, the Ohio courts had considered only a handful of "impact fee-like" cases, all of which involved fees charged to new development for either utility tapins or recreational facilities. These cases focused on three main issues: (1) whether 25 the charges should be considered a fee or a tax; (2) under what authority was the fee (or tax) enacted; and (3) the reasonableness of the amount of the fee (or tax).
In decisions spanning almost three decades that formed the backdrop for the Beavercreek decision, Ohio courts ruled that: (1) municipalities had authority under Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution 32 to adopt ordinances for water and sewer tap-in fees, so long as the fees are "fair and reasonable and bear a substantial relationship to the cost involved in providing the service;" 33 (2) it is unlawful to impose fees that exceed the costs of the services provided; 34 (3) taxing new development to fund building, maintaining and operating new recreation facilities is lawful, provided the revenue derived from the tax is " Force Base and Wright State University" plus plans for a regional mall in the same general area. 37 The city manager decided that an impact fee ordinance should be enacted to help finance road construction and formed a team of city employees and outside consultants to formulate an impact fee ordinance which was enacted in November 1993. 38 The Homebuilders Association and owners of properties affected by the ordinance sued. The trial court partially granted the city's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the city could lawfully enact an impact fee ordinance based on its police powers and home rule authority and that the ordinance was not an invalid tax, but denied summary judgment for both sides on equal protection and due process claims. At trial, the court rejected all challenges 501 (8 th Dist. 1995), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 74 Ohio St.3d 1417, 655 N.E.2d 738 (1995), reconsideration denied, 74 Ohio St.3d 1465, 656 N.E.2d 1300 (1995), the appeals court invalidated a recreation facility impact fee on new development. The court characterized the "fee" as a tax and ruled it was unlawful because the funds generated from taxing new development could be used to maintain and operate existing recreation facilities and there was no matching funds requirement as had been the case in Towne Properties.
36 Westlake, n. 35, supra. . 38 Id. The "team" comprised the City Attorney, City Planning Director, City Engineer, City Finance Director, Assistant City Manager, and outside consultants in planning/engineering and economic forecasting. The ordinance language itself was based on a model impact fee ordinance promulgated by the American Planning Association. Id. at *2.
to the ordinance, including a claim that the ordinance was an unconstitutional taking without compensation, 39 and entered judgment for the city. 40 The District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, but was then itself reversed by the Supreme Court. The critical point on which the District Court and the Supreme Court differed was whether the amounts charged under Beavercreek's impact fee ordinance constituted an invalid tax. The District Court had characterized the charges as a tax. While it acknowledged that "some features weigh in favor of the impact charge being considered a fee, the more significant criteria point to the fact that the fee is, in reality, a tax." 41 705 (1991) , cited the following to support its finding: (1) funds collected under the ordinance were placed in the city's general revenue fund and then used to pay for litigation expenses in defending the ordinance; (2) interest earned on the funds collected under the ordinance were placed in the city's general revenue fund; (3) a small group is paying the fees while the benefits paid for by the fees are available to the public generally; and (4) the primary purpose of the fee was to raise revenue rather than to regulate. Id. at *7-*11. 1300 (1995) Beavercreek at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court majority rejected the District Court's tax vs. fee dichotomy, arguing that "the important factor in determining the constitutionality of an ordinance is whether the ordinance is unduly burdensome in application and not its label as a tax or an impact fee." 44 The majority then argued that while a matching fund provision was a factor that courts might consider to determine the constitutionality of an impact fee, the lack of a matching fund was not fatal constitutionally. Rather, "[t]he appropriate test is one that examines whether the fee is in proportion to the developer's share of the city's costs to construct and maintain roadways that will be used by the general public." 45 "Proportionality" would seem to be a workable test for the legality of an impact fee, and, in fact, is part of the Nollan/Dolan "dual rational nexus/proportionality" test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court as appropriate to determine the constitutionality of development exactions. 46 The Beavercreek (2006), where the author writes: "It has been uniformly stated by analysts, courts, and legislatures that on-going operation and maintenance expenses are not to be paid for by impact fees and that the fees are only to provide funding for capital improvement costs necessitated by development. This view apparently stems from the view that the funding of operation and maintenance should come from generally-derived tax revenues as a general operating cost of government. Implicit in this outlook us the idea that such a general community expense should not be charged to a limited segment of the locality's population through a focused impact fee on new development," citing Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW, 328-32 (2003). majority, however, engaged in an extensive discussion of what test they should adopt, analyzing how the District Court, and the trial court before it, had addressed the plaintiffs' assertion that the impact fee ordinance was an illegal taking of property without just compensation in violation of both the United States and Ohio constitutions. 47 The majority ultimately agreed with the trial court that the Nollan/Dolan standard was the most appropriate. 48 The majority's standard required first, that the city "demonstrate that there is a reasonable relationship between the city's interests in constructing new 47 City of Beavercreek, 89 Ohio St.3d at 126-128, 729 N.E.2d at 354-56. The trial court had applied the Nollan/Dolan test in upholding the impact fee. The District Court, after an exhaustive analysis of the appropriate standard, ultimately concluded that: "although the words used to describe the various tests may be different, the tests all actually focus in legal terms, and in application, on the existence of a connection between the dedication or fee and the needs generated by the development. Whether one wants to call this 'reasonable relationship,' 'rational nexus,' 'rough proportionality,' or 'specifically and uniquely attributable,' the important issue is whether the dedication or fee is reasonably connected to the needs created by the development." City of Beavercreek, 1998 WL 735931 at *18.
roadways and the increase in traffic generated by new development." 49 If that reasonable relationship is demonstrated, the city must then demonstrate "that there is a reasonable relationship between the impact fee imposed by Beavercreek and the benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new roadways." 50 The majority noted that this portion of the test "addresses whether the developer and the city are paying their proportionate shares of the costs necessary to construct new roadways." 51 The majority then explained that while a matching fund provision was one way to measure whether a city's contribution met its obligation to pay a proportionate share of project costs, it was not the only permissible way the city could meet its proportionate share obligation, noting various "credits" that the city would apply towards a developer's obligation under the ordinance. 52 Applying the standard it had just announced, the majority concluded that the city had met its burden.
Three of the seven Justices dissented. Justice Pfeiffer, joined by Justice Resnick, rejected the majority's argument that "classification as an impact fee or a tax is not determinative" and would have struck down the impact fee ordinance as an unconstitutional tax. 53 In the alternative, he argued that if a particular impact fee ordinance was not found to be an invalid tax, then he would favor judging the constitutionality of the fee under the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development" standard, a "stricter test than that put forth by the majority." 54 Finally, he claimed that the impact fee at issue did not meet the second part of the majority's dual rational nexus test because the city was not obligated to provide any of the credits potentially available. 55 Justice Cook dissented separately, stating that he would have affirmed the District Court based on that court's reasoning that the impact fee was actually an invalid tax because the ordinance did not contain a mandatory matching funds provision. 56 Limits of the Beavercreek Ruling Given the lack of state impact fee enabling legislation in Ohio, the Beavercreek ruling at least clarified that municipalities could enact impact fees based on their police and home rule powers 57 Is there any obligation to first correct existing conditions that do not satisfy adopted level of service standards before addressing future conditions? What kind of requirements should be placed on municipalities to plan future land use on which the full build-out of the impact fee district may be calculated and to prepare, adopt, and execute capital improvement programs? Until the Ohio General Assembly acts, these questions and many, many others will be litigated, no doubt expensively, on a case-by-case basis. 59 The above list is far from exhaustive. There are many other questions that Beavercreek failed to address, several of which are quite fundamental. A basic question that state enabling legislation could address is the types of infrastructure, facilities or services that can be funded through impact fees. Beavercreek involved road improvements, and the majority opinion makes no mention of other types of facilities, but impact fees have been used to fund far more than roads. There are also numerous "design" issues that can be addressed through an enabling statute. To list just a few: (1) will there be a requirement that the imposition of an impact fee be based on a capital facilities plan and/or future landuse plan?; 67 (2) when should an impact fee be assessed (or the amount calculated) and when should it be collected?; 68 (3) how frequently must an impact fee be re- 2000)(exempting age-restricted mobile home park that did not permit children as residents from payment of impact fee for schools). 67 These would be formal documents developed separately from whatever planning was required to justify the imposition of the impact fee. For example, the former Utah impact fee enabling statute, Utah Code. Ann. 11-36-201, repealed by Laws 2011, c. 47, § 41, eff. May 11, 2011, required a capital facilities plan as a condition for enacting an impact fee.
68 Developers normally favor having impact fees calculated as soon as possible in the permit approval process, so they know what the amounts will be early-on and can build that into their financial projections, with collection of the fees postponed to the latest possible date in the permit approval process so as to minimize the developer's carrying costs. Government normally favors calculation as late as possible, to avoid the need for recalculation or possible refunds if the project size changes, and collection as soon as possible, again for obvious reasons. The majority of vacant land undergoing development lay in townships, not municipalities; 71 thus, townships were facing the greatest demand for new infrastructure to serve the new development. Further, since 1991, Ohio townships had been able to adopt a "limited home rule" form of government and so it was certainly conceivable that the Beavercreek ruling that impact fees could be enacted based on municipal "home rule" authority might, in an appropriate case, be 69 Every two years? Every five? Ten? 70 The use of impact fee revenue to pay for defending the lawsuit against the City of Beavercreek had been one of the factors cited by the District Court in declaring that the impact fee was actually a tax.
City of Beavercreek, 1998 WL 735931 at *6 -*9. 73 Ohio Revised Code (ORC) Chapter 504 governs the establishment of and powers granted to townships which adopt a limited home rule form of government. Limited home rule enables townships to enact legislation over a broad range of areas in which that they could not have legislated as a statutory township having only those powers granted expressly by the ORC. As with home rule municipalities, limited home rule townships may not enact legislation specifically prohibited by the ORC or in conflict with the general laws of the state.
74 Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, the only other remaining member of the Beavercreek Court, had joined the four Justice majority in that case. 75 Cincinnati borders the Ohio River and thus portions of I-275 are in both Ohio and Kentucky.
for development plus good schools and services, have made the Township a very desirable place to live: 76 the population has quadrupled over the past two decades. 77 Such rapid growth, creating significant demand for both infrastructure and government services, is exactly the circumstance that leads local government to enact an impact fee ordinance, which is what Hamilton Township did on May 2, 2007. 78 The "ordinance" -Ohio Township legislation is termed a Resolution and I will use that term hereafter --was fairly sophisticated by any standard. It included four fee categories: a road impact fee, a fire protection impact fee, a police protection impact fee, and a park impact fee. The amount of each fee would be calculated for several different types of land-uses (e.g., single-family, multi-family, retail/commercial, industrial, etc.) based on the demand for infrastructure/services that had been calculated for each land-use. 79 Each of the fees was to be kept in separate accounts that were segregated from the Township's general fund. If the fees were not spent on projects initiated 79 Thus, for example, single-family and multi-family dwellings paid a park impact fee, but nonresidential land-uses did not. Similarly, a retail/commercial land-use paid fire and police impact fees totaling $697 per 1,000 sq. ft., while a warehouse land-use paid only $157 per 1,000 square feet. Id. within three years of their collection date, they would be returned, with interest, to the party that paid the fee. 80 The resolution also exempted certain types of development from payment 81 and created a system of credits towards the road impact fee for certain roadway improvements. 82 Finally, the fees would be phased-in over a two-year period, starting at 33% of their full amount 90-days after the effective date of the resolution, increasing to 66% of their full amount one-year after that, and reaching 100% after a second year. 83 In the fall of 2007, several developers subject to the fees brought suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Township. 84 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District upheld the trial court in a unanimous decision, 80 Id. 81 The Resolution exempted the following from payment of fees: (1) Alterations of an existing dwelling unit where no additional dwelling units are created. (2) Replacement of a destroyed, partially destroyed or moved residential building or structure with a new building or structure of the same use and with the same number of dwelling units as the original building or structure. This exemption shall not apply in the case of a destroyed, partially destroyed or moved structure which contains an illegal nonconforming use under the zoning regulations of Hamilton Township, Ohio. (3) Replacement of a destroyed, partially destroyed or moved nonresidential building or structure with a new building or structure of the same use and not exceeding the gross floor area of the original building or structure. (4) Any development for which a completed application for a zoning certificate was submitted prior to the effective date of this resolution, provided that the construction proceeds according to the provisions of the building permit for which the zoning certificate was issued and the permit does not expire prior to the completion of the construction. In the event that the zoning certificate does expire before completion of construction, then the provisions of this impact fee shall apply to the development. In such case, the zoning certificate shall not be issued without the payment of the impact fee. "Hamilton Township Impact Fee Administrative Rules 7-8 (August 21, 2007). On file with author and available at http://zoning.hamilton-township.org/wpcontent/uploads/impactFees_11-2008.pdf. 82 Id. at 8-13. 83 Id. at 3. Gradually phasing-in the fees provides developers subject to the fees time to account for the fees in their financial calculations. See generally, Altshuler & Gomez-Ibanez, n. 21, supra., at 97-111, discussing at length the factors that determine which party or parties in the land development and sales process will bear the cost of the impact fee.
with Judge Powell focusing on the question of whether the impact fees at issue were a tax versus a fee and ruling that they were a fee rather than a prohibited form of taxation. 85 Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Pfeiffer reversed the Twelfth District in an opinion that is perplexing, if not distressing, for its failure to explain why the Court here engaged in an analysis of the "tax vs. fee" issue that differed so greatly from that in Beavercreek. management districts on persons disposing of materials at their facilities were fees or taxes for purposes of the federal Tax Injunction Act. 88 Justice Pfeiffer first applied what he termed the "Withrow Factors" 89 and argued that the impact fee "differs in several important respects from the assessment this court deemed a fee in Withrow." 90 Justice Pfeiffer found that the impact fee: (1) "lacks the regulatory aspect of the fee charged in Withrow," arguing that it was "a revenue generator with the stated purpose of guaranteeing a consistent level of services to all members of the community" that does not "protect the public from specific threats," (2) "the revenue generated by the assessment in this case is spent on typical township expenses inuring to the benefit of the entire community,"; (3) "assessed parties gen to particular service above that provided to any other taxpayer for the fee that they pay," and (4) the fee is not "tied to events" but to "the spending whims of government." 91 Characterizing the analysis in Am. Landfill as "similar to that used in Withrow," 92 Justice Pfeiffer applied that analysis to the Township's impact fee and reached the same conclusion: the impact fee was actually a tax. 93 88 June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932, codified at. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
89 The "Withrow Factors," in Justice Pfeiffer's view were: (1) is the fee "imposed in furtherance of regulatory measures"?; (2) is the fee "never placed in the general fund" and used only for "narrow and specific" regulatory purposes?; (3) is the fee imposed by government in exchange for a service it provides?; and (4) 92 Id. at * 6. 93 Id. at * 8.
While Justice Pfeiffer found that these cases supported his conclusion that the impact fee was actually an unauthorized tax, he acknowledged that neither case had "involved the type of assessment at issue in this case" 94 and proceeded to discuss "other state supreme courts facing very similar matters [that] have found that impact fees constituted taxes," noting that a "key factor in those cases was the extent of the public benefit that resulted from the assessment." 95 federal Fifth Circuit case. 98 Justice Pfeiffer argued that these cases buttressed his conclusion that the impact fee at issue was an invalid tax: each found that the benefits that were paid for by the impact fee(s) accrued to the community at large rather than only to those who had paid the fee(s), and, in his view, this was also the case for the Hamilton Township impact fees. 99 94 Id. from dedication requirements inside a subdivision to outside a subdivision; from dedication requirements to fee-in-lieu of dedication requirements, and most recently, from fee-in lieu of requirements to assessment of impact fees. 100 Because 100 See Rosenberg, n. 45 supra. at 191-204. Professor Rosenberg sub-titles his discussion of the evolution of infrastructure funding as "An American Tradition" and argues that the twentieth century saw "a steady growth in the use of land development exactions to impose specific costs on land developers." Further, "This trend has accelerated in the last two decades and has resulted in fee-in-lieu requirements and impact fees each involve developers' making cash payments, one of the most common challenges to these methods has been the claim that the fee in question was really a tax. 101 Numerous courts have grappled with that question, with little consistency in their decisions. 102 Scholars have noted the problem 103 and been critical of the results. 104 They have concluded that impact fees have aspects of both fees and taxes and cannot be characterized definitively as either. 105 This scholarly critique of the fee versus tax issue calls Justice Pfeiffer's opinion into question on two counts.
First, of course, it questions the Justice's effort to characterize the Township's the widespread use of subdivision land improvement and dedication requirements, impact fees, and linkage programs all having the effect of shifting development-related expenses from the community to the land developer." Id. at 192. impact fee in those terms in the first place. Second, it questions the Justice's failure to distinguish the many cases where state supreme courts found that impact fees did not constitute taxes. 106 My harshest criticism of the Hamilton Township Court, is not limited to Justice Pfeiffer's opinion, however. One is hard-pressed to state a principled reason why none of the Justices saw fit to acknowledge that this very Court, "facing very similar matters" only twelve years before in Beavercreek, had rejected Hamilton Township's tax vs. fee dichotomy, arguing instead that "the important factor in determining the constitutionality of an ordinance is whether the ordinance is unduly burdensome in application and not its label as a tax or an impact fee." 107 We are, regrettably, left with the distressing conclusion that the Court's failure to explain why in Hamilton Township it revived the tax vs. fee analysis rejected in Beavercreek, is most likely outcome driven.
Recall that in Beavercreek Justice Pfeiffer's dissent had rejected the majority's argument that "classification as an impact fee or a tax is not determinative" and would have struck down the impact fee ordinance as an unconstitutional tax. 108 He argued further that if a particular impact fee ordinance was not found to be an invalid tax, then he would favor judging the constitutionality 106 See, Rosenberg, n. 45, supra. at 249-252 (discussing at length the different approaches used and outcomes reached by various courts that have addressed whether an impact fee should be classified as a tax or a fee and finding that "the decisions did not indicate any clear pattern in results, with half of the impact fees being classified as regulatory devices while the other half were characterized as 'taxes.'" Id. at 250. of the fee under the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development" standard, a "stricter test than that put forth by the majority. 114 See discussion in text at ns. 17-23 supra. 115 The operation of the Beavercreek impact fee ordinance is typical. As described by the Second District: "Under the ordinance, fees for single family developments had to be paid before the City's release and approval of the plat for the development, unless the platting was done in more than one section. In such an event, the fee applicable to a particular section needed to be paid before approval and release of the plat for the section. For all other land development activity, the fee payment was due before the City issued a zoning permit or a certificate of zoning compliance for the development." City of Beavercreek, 1998 WL 735931 at *3.
116 See discussion in text at ns. 101-105, supra.
rulings, all of which favor one side of that debate, is more akin to advocacy than judging; and poor advocacy at that. 117 Where are we and what, if anything, should we do about it?
Where Are We?
As a result of Hamilton Township, Ohio now has different tests for judging the legality of a development impact fee depending on whether the challenged fee was enacted by a municipality or a township. If the fee was enacted by a municipality, the court will apply Beavercreek's dual rational nexus test. Any welldrafted impact fee would likely survive judicial scrutiny under that test. 118 On the other hand, if the fee was enacted by a limited home-rule township, 119 the court, applying Hamilton Township, must first determine whether the "fee" is really a "tax" by applying the "Withrow factors." It is highly unlikely that even a welldrafted impact fee resolution would avoid a fatal characterization as a tax. 117 An appellant's attorney would be foolhardy to file a brief that failed to acknowledge and attempt to distinguish opposing authority. Further, if the opposing authority is from the controlling jurisdiction -as Beavercreek almost assuredly was here --then the failure to disclose would violate 119 An attempt by a statutory township to enact an impact fee resolution would, if challenged, likely be declared ultra vires. Such townships lacking both subdivision regulatory authority and limited home rule powers, may exercise only those powers which have been explicitly authorized by the legislature. To date, this does not include the power to enact impact fees.
Even if a township's impact fee avoided characterization as a tax, it's survival would not be assured. If the court accorded Beavercreek precedential effect on the issue of what standard should be applied to determine the constitutionality of a fee, and applied the dual rational nexus test, then any fee that had avoided characterization as a tax would likely, but not assuredly, survive. 120 But a court might deny Beavercreek has precedential effect -perhaps using the reasoning I noted previously 121 -which would leave a court free to adopt a more stringent test than dual rational nexus; most likely the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development" approach that Justice Pfeiffer favored in his Beavercreek dissent. 122 Survival of an impact fee under that standard is far less likely. 123 From the viewpoint of advocates for the use of impact fees, the practical effect of these differing standards is perverse: impact fees are defensible in municipalities, where the pace of new development, and thus the need for impact fees is less, but effectively prohibited in townships where rapid development creates the most 120 See n 118, supra.
121 See discussion in text at ns.113-115, supra. 123 See, Juergensmeyer & Roberts, n. 29, supra. at 417, describing the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development" test as "an almost insurmountable burden on local governments seeking money payments for extradevelopment capital spending from developers whose activities necessitated such expenditures." See also,Rosenberg, n. 45, supra, at 221-22, describing the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development" test as "a highly restrictive view" that demands "a rigorous review of land use exactions and a near-linear cause and effect relationship between growth and public infrastructure." pressing need for impact fees. 124 Obviously, those opposed to impact fees are likely to see it differently: applauding the Court's barring their use precisely where they most likely would have been enacted.
What, if anything, should we do about it?
The question of whether we should do anything about the current legal status of impact fees in Ohio depends, of course, on whether one believes impact fees are an efficient and equitable method to fund the provision of infrastructure and the capital costs of services that are necessitated by residential growth and the nonresidential development that accompanies it. Views on this question are emphatically mixed and the literature provides no definitive answers. 125 That said, the fact that twenty-eight states have adopted impact fee enabling legislation, 126 including half the states neighboring Ohio, 127 argues strongly that, at 124 See discussion in text at n.71, supra. burden of impact fees and concluding that burden "will be determined based on the pattern of supply and demand in a particular housing market"); Rosenberg, n. 45, supra, at 182 (stating: "Not surprisingly, this emerging impact fee practice has been exceedingly popular with local governments and current residents, and it has dramatically accelerated over the last twenty years. On the other hand, the practice has also been strongly criticized by landowners, developers, and affordable housing advocates as unfairly increasing the cost of new construction, imposing an unfair 'tax' and raising housing prices. Some have suggested that such fees actually constitute de facto growth controls with exclusionary implications." See, generally, Altshuler & Gomez-Ibanez, n. 21, supra. at 6-7. 126 See jurisdictions listed at n. 8, supra. 127 Id. They are: Indiana, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. the least, it is time for the Ohio General Assembly to consider such legislation seriously. 128 In 2004, the "Wolpert Report" had recommended that Ohio adopt enabling legislation that would grant authority to townships and counties to adopt impact fees and to school districts to adopt impact fees for schools. 129 A bill along those lines, H.B. 299, was introduced in the 126 th General Assembly, 130 but died with no further action taken in the Local Government Committee. 131 No other impact fee enabling legislation has subsequently been introduced. 132 While H.B. 299 at least put the impact fee issue on the legislative agenda, however briefly, its provisions were fairly sparse in comparison to more comprehensive impact fee legislation, adopted elsewhere, which addresses the 128 Calls for legislative action to authorize impact fees were made in both Iowa and Mississippi after details of impact fees systems to a much greater extent. 133 Accordingly, reviving H.B. 299, or something similar, would be far less preferable to proposing more comprehensive legislation that answers most, if not all of the questions this article has noted. 134 Moreover, even if there is no support for legislation that would extend authority to enact impact fees to townships --or to counties and school districtsthere is still need for enabling legislation for municipalities that would fill in the numerous gaps in the Beavercreek ruling. 135 The time is long-past for Ohio to join the majority of states that have adopted enabling legislation for development impact fees.
Conclusion
The Ohio Supreme Court's recent ruling in Drees Company, et. al. v.
Hamilton Township, 136 invalidating the development impact fees adopted by a limited home rule township, is a deeply distressing decision. In Hamilton Township, the Court, rather than engaging in a fair-handed analysis, chose instead to rely on very limited authority to support a conclusion that appears to have been predetermined. In particular, the Court failed even to acknowledge, let alone where the pace of new development, and thus the need for impact fees is less, but effectively prohibited in townships where rapid development creates the most pressing need for impact fees. Given the Court's conflicting rulings, the time is longpast for the legislature to examine the policy debate on impact fees and make a decision about adopting enabling legislation for impact fees. That decision should be to join the majority of states that have enacted such legislation.
